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GETTING PERSONAL WITH OUR NEIGHBORS-A
SURVEY OF SOUTHERN STATES' EXERCISE OF
GENERAL JURISDICTION AND A PROPOSAL FOR
EXTENDING GEORGIA'S LONG-ARM STATUTE
Robert L. Ashe III,* Austin M. Hall, +
and Avery S. Jackson °
INTRODUCTION
This note analyzes the exercise of personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants by Georgia and neighboring Southern
jurisdictions, focusing on their use of their long-arm statutes and
service of process requirements (whether embodied in statute or court
rule).' The specific focus is whether the covered jurisdictions permit
their courts to exercise so-called general jurisdiction-in other words,
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant in an action not
arising from the defendant's contacts with the forum state.
This Note starts by presenting an abbreviated history of the United
States Supreme Court's major decisions relating to state courts'
exercise of personal jurisdiction over nonresident defendants, with
particular attention to the three cases in which the United States
Supreme Court has discussed general jurisdiction. 3 This Note then
examines the long-arm laws and, where relevant, service of process
* Mr. Ashe graduated from the Georgia State University College of Law in May 2009 where he
was a Legislative Editor of the Law Review. He practices law at Bondurant, Mixson & Elmore LLP in
Atlanta and is a certified barbeque judge.
+ Mr. Hall graduated from the Georgia State University College of Law in May 2009 where he was
a Lead Articles Editor of the Law Review.
* Mr. Jackson is an associate at the firm of Tisinger Vance, P.C., in Carrollton, Georgia. He
graduated from the Georgia State University College of Law in May 2008.
1. See infra section H.
2. For a discussion of general jurisdiction, see ROBERT C. CASAD & WILLIAM M. RICHMAN,
JURISDICTION IN CIVIL ACTIONs 139-44 (3d ed. 1998). For criticism of the concept of general
jurisdiction, see generally Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARv. L. REV. 610
(1988).
3. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
For discussion of these cases, see infra text accompanying notes 30-40.
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rules in Georgia and other Southern states to understand
contemporary practices.4 The jurisdictions are categorized on the
basis of whether they permit their courts to exercise general
jurisdiction and, if so, under what circumstances. 5 For each
jurisdiction, the relevant statutes, regulations, and case law are
evaluated to determine how the exercise of jurisdiction is authorized.6
It concludes by proposing a revision to the Georgia long-arm statute,
which would bring Georgia into line with the majority of states
studied, by permitting Georgia courts to exercise personal jurisdiction
to the limits imposed by the Due Process Clause of the 14th
Amendment to the United States Constitution, including general
jurisdiction.7
A. Background
The United States Supreme Court has over the years announced a
variety of justifications for limiting the exercise of personal
jurisdiction by a state over a nonresident defendant.8 While this note
does not remotely purport to describe or evaluate what the
constitutional limits on the exercise of personal jurisdiction are, some
understanding of United States Supreme Court precedent on this
topic is useful in evaluating modem practices by the states. The
evolution (or revolution) in the twentieth century away from the
'power' theory embodied in Pennoyer v. Neff towards an evaluation
of whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction in a particular case
would "offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial
justice"' permitted states to adopt a variety of approaches towards the
exercise of personal jurisdiction.9 Those approaches are the main
topic of this Note. Specifically, the United States Supreme Court has
4. See infra section H.
5. See infra section H.
6. See infra section H.
7. See infra Section III.
8. CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 2, at 67-178.
9. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)
(citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)), discussed infra in the text accompanying notes
20-29.
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GETTING PERSONAL WITH OUR NEIGHBORS
affirmed and reaffirmed the existence of what it has described as
general jurisdiction, namely a state's exercise of personal jurisdiction
over a nonresident defendant in a cause of action not arising from that
defendant's contacts with the forum state. 10
In the beginning, there was Pennoyer, and it was good. Decided in
1878, Pennoyer v. Neff "for nearly a century served as the basic
statement of the limits on state court jurisdiction imposed by the 14th
Amendment due process clause."" In striking down an Oregon state
court judgment against a nonresident who did not appear in court,
was not present in Oregon, and did not live in Oregon on the basis
that the Oregon state court could not validly exercise personal
jurisdiction over the nonresident, Pennoyer established that "due
process essentially limits the personal jurisdiction of state courts to
the three traditional bases of consent, presence, and domicile."'12 The
"territorial power theory" that Pennoyer embraced "treated the States
as nearly independent sovereigns," and was focused almost entirely
on the physical presence of the defendant or his property. 13 The result
of the focus on territorial power was that "a state has absolute power
over defendants or property found within its territorial boundaries,
regardless of the nature of the dispute."' 14 As a necessary corollary, a
state had very little power over nonresidents who did not own
property within its boundaries, and that limitation eventually "caused
[the power theory from Pennoyer] to fall out of step with the realities
of twentieth century life," particularly over corporate defendants.'
5
Some states used statutes requiring corporations doing business in
their state "to appoint agents for service of process . . . and
designat[e] a state official to receive such service if the corporation
failed to appoint an agent" to create a fictive form of corporate
consent to jurisdiction.' 6 Another theory used was that a nonresident
10. See infra notes 30-41 and accompanying text.
11. CASAD & RICHmAN, supra note 2, at 68.
12. Id. at 68, 70.
13. Id. at 71-72.
14. Twitchell, supra note 2, at 619.
15. CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 2, at 80.
16. Id. at 77; Twitchell, supra note 2, at 620.
20091 1179
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corporation was "'present' wherever it was doing business and could
be sued in the courts of that state just as a nonresident individual
found there could be."' 17 These theories were used by some states to
justify jurisdiction over corporate defendants not just in actions
arising from the corporation's specific activities within the forum
state, but also in other causes of action.1i As one commentator has
noted, "the legacy of these rules is a strand of general jurisdiction
theory that recognizes relatively unlimited jurisdiction over corporate
and individual defendants having certain commercial ties with the
forum."'
19
B. International Shoe Co. v. Washington
In 1945, the United States Supreme Court's decision in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington began a "doctrinal revolution.
. . best viewed as a shift in the conceptual basis of state-court
jurisdiction from power towards fundamental fairness." 20 In
abandoning the requirement of the defendant's presence within the
forum state, the Court established that due process would only
require that a defendant not present in the forum state "have certain
minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."' 21 The Court held that the demands of due
process "may be met by such contacts of the corporation with the
state of the forum as make it reasonable, in the context of our federal
system of government, to require the corporation to defend the
particular suit which is brought there. 22
In rejecting a "mechanical or quantitative" approach towards
determining what contacts would suffice to justify the exercise of
17. CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 2, at 78.
18. Id. at 77; Twitchell, supra note 2, at 621.
19. Twitchell, supra note 2, at 622.
20. CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 2, at 81.
21. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457,
463 (1940)).
22. Id. at317.
1180 [Vol. 25:4
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GETTING PERSONAL WITH OUR NEIGHBORS
jurisdiction, the Court emphasized that courts must evaluate the
"quality and nature of the [defendant's] activity in relation to the fair
and orderly administration of the laws." 23 The Court noted that when
a corporation conducted activities within a state, it was enjoying the
"benefits and protection of the laws of that state," and that the
"exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations." 24 The Court
went on to explain that in cases where "those obligations arise out of
or are connected with the activities within the state, a procedure
which requires the corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce
them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue.,
25
The immediately preceding quotation suggests that a state can
presumptively exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant for
causes of action arising from that defendant's contacts with the forum
state (what would later be deemed specific jurisdiction). The Court
also noted that "there have been instances in which the continuous
corporate operations within a state were thought so substantial and of
such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising
from dealings entirely distinct from those activities"--in other words,
general jurisdiction.2 6
While International Shoe left a number of questions unresolved-
which numerous cases during the subsequent sixty years have tried to
address-this Note does not attempt to catalog or analyze them,
because that ground has been well-plowed previously.27 The specific
question relevant for the survey undertaken in Section II is whether a
state court may, consistent with due process, exercise general
jurisdiction-that is, personal jurisdiction over a nonpresent
23. Id. at 319.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 318. The commonly attributed source of the specific/general jurisdiction distinction is
Arthur von Mehren & Donald Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARv. L.
REV. 1121 (1966); see also Casad & Richman, supra note 2, at 139-44; see generally Twitchell, supra
note 2.
27. See, e.g., Joanna B. Bossin, Note, What Constitutes Minimum Contacts in Cyberspace After
Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson: Are New Rules Necessary for a New Regime?, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV.
521, 524-26 (1997); CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 2; Twitchell, supra note 2; von Mehren &
Trautman, supra note 26.
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defendant, on claims unrelated to the defendant's forum contacts.28
The United States Supreme Court, in three decisions following
International Shoe, consistently held the answer is yes, albeit only in
limited circumstances. 29 Again, this Note does not evaluate those
cases, but rather describes them in summary fashion so as to
illuminate the survey of current state practices described in Section
II.
C. The United States Supreme Court & General Jurisdiction
1. Perkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co.
In 1952, the United States Supreme Court held that Ohio could
validly exercise personal jurisdiction "to enforce a cause of action not
arising out of the [defendant's] activities in the state of the forum." 30
The defendant in this case was a Philippine company whose president
and principal stockholder, after being forced to leave the Philippines
during World War II, moved to Ohio, opened an office there, and
generally "carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic
supervision of the necessarily limited wartime activities of the
company.",31 The cause of action did not arise in Ohio, nor did it
"relate to the corporation's activities there." 32 The Court's holding,
permitting "proceeding in personam to enforce a cause of action not
arising out of the corporation's activities in the state of the forum,"
explicitly built on the language from International Shoe regarding
"continuous corporate operations within a state" that were "so
substantial and of such a nature" that they could justify suit against a
defendant on causes of action unrelated to the defendant's forum
contacts.
33
28. See infra section I; CASAD & RICHMAN, supra note 2, at 140.
29. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952), Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
30. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 446.
31. Id. at 447-48.
32. Id. at 438.
33. Id. at446 (citing Int'l Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)).
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2. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall
In 1984, the United States Supreme Court addressed the question
of whether a Colombian corporation could be sued in Texas over a
helicopter crash in Peru.34 The plaintiffs asserted that the
corporation's purchases of helicopters in Texas, the training of its
pilots in Texas, and a solitary negotiation in Texas were sufficient
contacts to permit Texas courts to exercise jurisdiction, even though
the plaintiffs conceded that the suit did not arise out of and was not
related to those contacts.35 The Court ultimately held that those
contacts were not "the kind of continuous and systematic general
business contacts... found [] in Perkins," and that accordingly Texas
could not exercise jurisdiction over the defendant. 36 The Court also
reaffirmed the rule from Perkins that upon a showing of continuous
and systematic contacts with a forum state, a defendant would be
subject to suit there "[e]ven when the cause of action does not arise
out of or relate to the foreign corporation's activities in the forum
State."37 In a footnote, the Court expressly applied the 'general
jurisdiction' label for an exercise of "personal jurisdiction over a
defendant in a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant's
contacts with the forum."
38
3. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, County of Main
The final United States Supreme Court case arguably involving the
exercise of general jurisdiction, Burnam v. Superior Court of
California, was decided in 1990 when the Court "unanimously
upheld the constitutionality of jurisdiction over a nonresident who
had been served with process while visiting the state." 39 While there
was no majority opinion-two groups of four Justices each
34. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 409-10 (1984).
35. Id. at 411,415.
36. Id. at 416, 418-19.
37. Id. at 414.
38. Id. at 414 n.9.
39. CASAD & RiCHMAN, supra note 2, at 122-23 (discussing Burnham v. Sup. Court of Cal., 495
U.S. 604 (1990)).
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"emphatically rejected the other's rationale" while Justice Stevens
"declin[ed] to agree with either side" in his separate opinion-there
was nonetheless a "clear holding."40 The Court unanimously agreed
that absent unusual circumstances, physical presence alone would
suffice to permit the exercise of general jurisdiction over a
defendant.
4 1
Although state courts are quick to repeat the mantra that their
jurisdiction extends to the limits of constitutional due process, many
State long arm statutes do not appear to provide for the exercise of
general jurisdiction. 42 This is partly the result of the chronology of
extra territorial jurisdiction.43 After the Supreme Court's decision in
International Shoe, many state legislatures passed long arm statutes
which they believed reached to the limits of due process.44 However,
these statutes were passed before the Supreme Court fully developed
its personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. 45 Thus, "codifying what the
courts had already decided tended to freeze in place the approved
categories and did not allow the courts to continue to define the limits
as their contours became clear in modem-scenario cases that arose
after International Shoe."46 The following section examines several
of Georgia's sister southern states (and Florida) to determine whether
they have taken advantage of the opportunity to exercise general
jurisdiction, and if so, under what circumstances and with what basis.
40. CASAD & RiCHMAN, supra note 2, at 123, 127.
41. Id. at 127.
42. Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Shiv K. Kapoor, Extraterritorial Personal Jurisdiction for the Twenty-
First Century: A Case Study Reconceptualizing the Typical Long-Arm Statute to Codify and Refine
International Shoe After Its First Sixty Years, 3 SEToN HALL CIRCUIT REv. 339, 345-46 (2007).
43. Id. at 345-46.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 346.
46. Id.
1184 [Vol 25:4
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I. STATE SURVEY
A. Alabama
Alabama is a full general jurisdiction state because its service of
process rules authorize service with only minimum contacts:
[O]utside of this state upon a person or entity in any action in
this state when the person or entity has such contacts with this
state that the prosecution of the action against the person or
entity in this state is not inconsistent with the constitution of this
state or the Constitution of the United States.47
The rule then goes on to provide that in an action against a "person or
entity [] sued in the capacity of guardian of a ward, or executor,
administrator, or other personal representative of an estate, for the
acts or omissions of a decedent or ward" service will be permitted
either if the person or entity being sued has sufficient contacts or the
decedent or ward did.48 This rule was amended in 2004 to remove the
so-called "laundry list" of contacts sufficient to justify out-of-state
service of process in light of consistent interpretation of the
"catchall" clause as going to the extent of federal due process.49
The Alabama Supreme Court has interpreted this rule to extend
"the personal jurisdiction of Alabama courts to the limit of due
process under the United States and Alabama Constitutions."5 The
47. ALA. R. CIv. P. 4.2(b).
48. Id.
49. See Committee Comments to Amendment to Rule 4.2 Effective August 1, 2004. The so-called
"laundry list" used to be former Rule 4.2(a)(2)(A)-(H). The former "catch-all" clause was contained in
former Rule 4.2(a)(2)(1), as discussed in Elliott v. Van Kleef, 830 So. 2d 726, 729 (Ala. 2002). For an
example of a case interpreting the prior catch-all clause as extending to the limits of due process, see id
at 730; see also Martin v. Robbins, 628 So. 2d 614, 617 (Ala. 1993). The order amending Rule 4.2,
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure, effective August 1, 2004, is published in the volume of the Alabama
Reporter that contains Alabama cases from 867 So. 2d. For an illuminating and well-reasoned
discussion of the prior Alabama rule, as well as advocacy of adoption of such a rule in Georgia by a
preeminent figure in the study of Georgia jurisprudence, see E.R. Lanier, Long Arm, Short Reach: The
Dilemma of Georgia's Long Arm Statute, The Verdict, Dec./Jan. 1990, at 22.
50. J. C. Duke & Assocs. Gen. Contractors v. West, 991 So. 2d 194, 197 (Ala. 2008).
20091 1185
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practical effect is to extend Alabama courts' jurisdiction out to the
limits of federal due process: the Alabama Supreme Court has
clarified that "[w]hen applying Rule 4.2(b), this Court has interpreted
the due process guaranteed under the Alabama Constitution as
coextensive with that guaranteed under the United States
Constitution."51  The Alabama Supreme Court has explicitly
adopted-and recently reaffirmed-the theory of general personal
jurisdiction arising from general contacts, which "consist of the
defendant's contacts with the forum state that are unrelated to the
cause of action and that are both 'continuous and systematic."'
52
B. Arkansas
Arkansas is a full general jurisdiction state, explicitly provided by
statute.53 The relevant code section provides that Arkansas courts
"shall have personal jurisdiction of all persons, and all causes of
action or claims for relief, to the maximum extent permitted by the
due process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution."54 Arkansas courts have accordingly
looked to "Fourteenth Amendment due-process jurisprudence when
deciding an issue of personal jurisdiction. 55
The Supreme Court of Arkansas first explicitly discussed the
emergence of general jurisdiction in Arkansas when construing a
1995 amendment to the Arkansas long-arm statute in Davis v. St.
Johns Health Sys. in 2002.56 In Davis, the Supreme Court of
Arkansas noted that the legislature's deletion of "the requirement that
the cause of action arise out of the nonresident defendant's specific
51. Id.
52. Id. at 197-98 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.9,
415 (1984)).
53. ARK. CODEANN. § 16-4-10i(B).
54. Id.
55. Payne v. France, 282 S.W.3d 760, 765 (Ark. 2008); Davis v. St. Johns Health Sys., 71 S.W.3d
55, 58 (Ark. 2002) (explaining that "when deciding an issue of personal jurisdiction," Arkansas courts
should "look[] only to Fourteenth Amendment due process jurisprudence" following the 1995 revisions
to the Arkansas long-arm statute, 1995 Ark. Acts 486, codified as ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-4-101(B)).
56. Davis, 71 S.W.3d at 57-59. The amendment was 1995 Ark. Acts 486, codified as ARK. CODE
ANN. § 16-4-101(B).
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contacts with the state . . . allowed [Arkansas] to exercise general
jurisdiction up to the limits of the due process clause. 57 The
Supreme Court of Arkansas has repeatedly reaffirmed its
commitment to general jurisdiction, describing it as arising in
"situations in which a nonresident defendant's contacts with a forum
state may be so substantial and continuous as to justify jurisdiction
over that defendant, even though the cause of action is 'entirely
distinct from those activities.' 58  Arkansas requires that the
defendant's contacts with Arkansas be "continuous, systematic, and
substantial" in order for their courts to exercise general jurisdiction. 59
C. Florida
The State of Florida60  provides its courts with full general
jurisdiction, in a statute that contains both specific jurisdiction
elements and a positive statement conferring general jurisdiction.6 1
Section 48.193(1) of the Florida statute is the specific jurisdiction
portion, containing eight specific scenarios which suffice to provide
Florida courts with specific jurisdiction over a claim. 62  Section
48.193(2) confers general jurisdiction upon Florida courts over a
"defendant who is engaged in substantial and not isolated activity
within this state, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate,
or otherwise ... whether or not the claim arises from that activity."
63
57. Davis, 71 S.W.3d. at 59 (explaining that "[b]y Act 486, the General Assembly authorized
Arkansas courts to exercise jurisdiction to the fullest extent due process will allow," and that "[t]he
effect of this change was to convert Arkansas into a general-jurisdiction state for purposes of personal
jurisdiction").
58. Id. at 58.
59. Payne, 282 S.W.3d at 766 (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S.
408, 414 n.9, 415 (1984)); Davis, 71 S.W.3d at 58-59.
60. The authors decided, for the sake of geographic consistency and thoroughness, to include the
state of Florida despite serious doubts about whether it is in fact a Southern state. See, e.g., THE BBQ
SONG, available at http://www.youtube.com/wath?v=6ubTQfrtyY.
61. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193; see also Haueter-Herranz v. Romero, 975 So. 2d 511, 516 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2008) (finding general jurisdiction existed over defendants and explaining "the long-arm
statute provides for two categories of personal jurisdiction: general jurisdiction under section 48.193(2)
and specific jurisdiction under section 48.193(1)(b)"--the tortious act "within this state" prong).
62. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193(l)(a)-(h).
63. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 48.193(2).
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Florida courts have interpreted the "substantial and not isolated
activity" language as meaning "continuous and systematic general
business contact" with Florida. 64 This interpretation has been
imposed to bring the Florida long-arm statute's conferral of general
jurisdiction into compliance with federal due process requirements,
as "enunciated by the [United States] Supreme Court in
Helicopteros."65  This interpretation has made the statutory
requirement coterminous with the due-process required showing of
minimum contacts between the defendant and Florida.66
D. Georgia
Georgia is a specific jurisdiction only state. Georgia's long-arm
statute, O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91, only confers specific jurisdiction: it only
provides for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over causes of
action "arising from any of the acts, omissions, ownership, use or
possession enumerated., 67 While Georgia courts frequently say that
they interpret the Georgia long-arm statute as extending as far as due
process will permit,68 Georgia courts have in fact-with one recent
anomaly-consistently interpreted the statute as not extending as far
as due process would allow by permitting general jurisdiction as well
as specific jurisdiction, but instead have required the cause of action
to arise from the defendant's contacts with Georgia. 69 This approach
64. See, e.g., Gadea v. Star Cruises, Ltd., 949 So. 2d 1143, 1145 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Nw.
Aircraft Capital Corp. v. Stewart, 842 So. 2d 190, 195 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2003).
65. Woods v. Nova Cos. Belize Ltd., 739 So. 2d 617, 620 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining
"[t]his 'continuous and systematic' contacts standard was the standard enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Helicopteros as sufficient to fulfill the due process requirements of minimum contacts when asserting
general jurisdiction").
66. See id. ("Because section 48.193(2) requires this high threshold, if the defendant's activities meet
the requirements of section 48.193(2), minimum contacts [are] also satisfied.").
67. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 (emphasis added).
68. See, e.g., SES Indus., Inc. v. lntertrade Packaging Mach. Corp., 512 S.E.2d 316, 318 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1999) (explaining that Georgia courts "have consistently held that our Long-Arm Statute confers
jurisdiction over nonresidents to the maximum extent permitted by due process").
69. See, e.g., Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., LLC v. First Nat'l Bank of Ames, 620 S.E.2d
352, 354-55 (Ga. 2005) (discussing how the "plain and unambiguous language" in subsection (3) of the
Georgia long-arm statute and Georgia courts' consistent "literal construction" of it have precluded
Georgia courts "from exercising personal jurisdiction over the nonresident to the fullest extent permitted
by constitutional due process"); Gust v. Flint, 356 S.E.2d 513, 514 (1987); Aero Toy Store, LLC v.
1188 [Vol 25:4
HeinOnline -- 25 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 1188 2008-2009
   I E SITY  I  L :  
 t tial  
t   s  
 64  
 '  l 
   ts, 
    10 
licopteros.,,65   
t s     
   t  66 
i  
  i ti   
,     
     l    f 
 ising  ,  
 t ., 67   
 t i      
 it,68  t 
t tly   
   i   
      
t's   
, ., . ,  
ft i   .    i i  
is ' s  atic'   
/ teros  t   
l  
.  t'  
 t   . ,  t  ]  . .   
, . I   
.              i ti    . 
. , . ., ti  l  lti  .,  .  '   ,  . .  
,35  t    
i  l  t t t   i  t ' i t t lit l t     
i     l      i  
l ; . );  
12
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 4 [2009], Art. 1
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol25/iss4/1
GETTING PERSONAL WITH OUR NEIGHBORS
differs from other Southern states whose long-arm statutes contain
limiting language-such as "arising under" or "arising from." 70 In
those states, appellate courts have simply ignored the limiting
language and purported to exercise general jurisdiction under a
statute that does not appear to support it.7 ' The (virtual) unanimity of
Georgia courts on this topic, oddly, has not constrained federal courts
interpreting Georgia's long-arm statute: they have routinely
construed it as providing general jurisdiction, usually without
72discussing Georgia precedent to the contrary.
The Georgia Court of Appeals case of Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Colemon recently broke sharply from the prior undiminished line by
permitting the exercise of general jurisdiction based upon the
defendant's "continuous and systematic business contact" with
Georgia.73 The Court of Appeals in Colemon cited Innovative
Clinical & Consulting Services v. First Nat ' Bank of Ames for the
idea that prong one of the Georgia long arm statute74 was to be read
as conferring all forms of personal jurisdiction permitted by
Grieves, 631 S.E.2d 734, 739 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (noting a requirement that the suit must arise out of
defendant's contacts with Georgia and that accordingly Georgia's long-arm statute did not authorize the
exercise of general jurisdiction); Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc. v. Sanders, 460 S.E.2d 94, 96, 97 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1995) (explaining that "the exercise of personal jurisdiction over [a nonresident] requires that
the cause of action arise out of its activities within [Georgia]"); Shellenberger v. Tanner, 227 S.E.2d
266, 273 (Ga. Ct. App. 1976) (discussing the prior version of Georgia's long-arm statute that also
contained the "arise from" requirement).
70. See discussion infra Sections ll.J Tennessee; u.K Texas.
71. See discussion infra Sections II.J Tennessee; ILK Texas.
72. See, e.g., Nippon Credit Bank, Ltd. v. Matthews, 291 F.3d 738, 745-49 (1 1th Cir. 2002) (using
the Georgia long-arm statute to exercise general jurisdiction over a Florida defendant in Georgia);
Francosteel Corp. v. MN Charm, 19 F.3d 624, 627 (11th Cir. 1994) (claiming "Georgia's long arm
statute confers in personam jurisdiction to the maximum extent allowed by the due process clause of the
federal Constitution"); Innovative Clinical & Consulting Seres., 620 S.E.2d at 354 n.2 (discussing
federal courts' continued "erroneous" interpretation of the Georgia long-arm statute as extending as far
as federal due process will permit). But see Baynes v. George E. Mason Funeral Home, Inc., No. 1:07-
CV-2805-JOF, 2008 WL 5191808, at *3 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 10, 2008) (discussing Innovative Clinical &
Consulting Services and Aero Toy Store in holding that the Georgia long arm statute required that the
cause of action arise from or be connected to the defendant's contact with Georgia).
73. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Colemon, 658 S.E.2d 843, 846-47 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008), cert. denied,
Ga. Supreme Court (2008). The petition for certiorari was docketed March 25, 2008, and was docket
number S08CI 164. The Supreme Court of Georgia denied the petition on June 30, 2008 and denied a
motion for reconsideration on July 25, 2008. Georgia Supreme Court, http://www.gasupreme.us/
docketsearch/results one record.php?docr case num-S08C 1164 (last visited October, 2009).
74. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1).
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procedural due process.75 The opinion then dismissed the defendant's
argument that the case did not "arise out of' their contacts with
Georgia on the logic that general jurisdiction permits personal
jurisdiction even through unrelated contacts, was consistent with due
process, and was justified because of the defendant's "continuous and
systematic business contact" with Georgia.
76
Notably, the Colemon court only analyzed due process
requirements for the exercise of personal jurisdiction, and did not
address the conflict between the preamble language in the Georgia
long-arm statute--"a cause of action arising from"77-in its finding
that general jurisdiction was available to Georgia courts. Nor did it
attempt to reconcile this new holding with the previous line of cases
rejecting general jurisdiction in Georgia.78 The defendants filed a
petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court of Georgia, but the
Supreme Court of Georgia denied the petition and a subsequent
motion for reconsideration.
79
In the 2005 case relied upon by the Colemon court, Innovative
Clinical & Consulting Services, the Supreme Court of Georgia
overturned several prior cases that had artificially constrained the
reach of prong one of Georgia's long-arm statute-the transacting
business prong-and explicitly construed it to reach as far as
permitted by due process. 80 That opinion, however, also reaffirmed
the Court's interpretation of prong three of the long-arm statute (a
tortious injury in Georgia, caused by act or omission outside Georgia)
as not extending as far as due process permits, and rejected the notion
that Georgia courts could ignore the "plain and unambiguous
75. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 658 S.E.2d at 845 (discussing O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1) and Innovative
Clinical & Consulting Servs).
76. Id. at 846-47.
77. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 (emphasis added).
78. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 658 S.E.2d at 846-47; see supra note 69.
79. See source cited supra note 73.
80. Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs. v. First Nat ' Bank of Ames, 620 S.E.2d 352, 355 (Ga.
App. 2005) (construing O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91(1)); see also Aero Toy Store, LLC v. Grieves, 631 S.E.2d
734, 738-39 (Ga. App. 2006) (discussing the holding of Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs.).
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language" of the statute and "interpret O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91 to provide
what the Legislature chose to omit."
8
'
While the Supreme Court in Innovative Clinical & Consulting
Services did emphasize that prong one should be read as "reaching []
'to the maximum extent permitted by procedural due process,"' it did
not address the interaction with the statutory language that arguably
keeps Georgia a specific jurisdiction state notwithstanding the new
interpretation of prong one-in other words, the "arising from"
language in the preamble to O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91. 82 As further
evidence that Innovative Clinical & Consulting Services did not
abandon the "arising from" limitation, the Georgia Supreme Court
lamented the Georgia General Assembly's continued refusal "to
provide the maximum protection for Georgia residents damaged by
the out-of-state acts or omissions committed by nonresident
tortfeasors"; the Court also reaffirmed that separation of powers
would make it "inappropriate" for the judiciary to "reject the plain
language of a statute. 83 Accordingly, the implication the Colemon
court apparently read into Innovative Clinical & Consulting
Services-that is, the judicial abandonment of the requirement that
the cause of action arise from the contact serving as the basis for
jurisdiction appears unjustified. Further, the record in Innovative
Clinical & Consulting Services contained no evidence of any contacts
by the defendant bank with Georgia aside from those with the
plaintiff, much less "continuous and systematic" contacts sufficient to
justify general jurisdiction, meaning Innovative Clinical &
Consulting Services cannot be read as anything other than a specific
84jurisdiction case.
81. Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., 620 S.E.2d at 355.
82. Id. (citing Coe & Payne Co. v. Wood-Mosaic Corp., 195 S.E.2d 399, 401 (Ga. App. 1973));
accord discussion of Pratt & Whitney Canada, Inc.v. Sanders, 460 S.E.2d 94 (Ga. App. 1995) in Aero
Toy Store, 631 S.E.2d at 739.
83. Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., 620 S.E.2d at 355.
84. Id. at 356 (briefly discussing defendant's contacts with Georgia and directing readers to the
Court of Appeals opinion for further explanation of those contacts: First Nat'l Bank of Ames v.
Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., LLC, 598 S.E.2d 530, 532 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004), overruled by
Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., LLC, 620 S.E.2d at 356) (Ga. 2005)).
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E. Kentucky
Kentucky appears to be a general jurisdiction state, despite having
a long-arm statute that textually only confers specific jurisdiction.85
The statute uses the "arising from" language, goes on to enumerate
several actions, and then states "[w]hen jurisdiction over a person is
based solely upon this section, only a claim arising from acts
enumerated in this section may be asserted against him." 86 Kentucky
courts, however, "have interpreted this statute to authorize in
personam jurisdiction to reach the outer limits of the due process
clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution." 87 Kentucky courts have interpreted the "transacting
any business" prong to permit litigation over injuries sustained
outside Kentucky, the language in KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §
454.210(2)(b) notwithstanding. 8
The Supreme Court of Kentucky in fact expressly rejected an
argument that the statutory language limited Kentucky courts to
hearing only claims arising from contact with Kentucky:
In practice, the precise language of the statute and the application
of its terms are much less important than the simple fact that the
statute exists. Courts have determined that "the long-arm statute
within this jurisdiction allows Kentucky courts to reach to the
full constitutional limits of due process in entertaining
jurisdiction over non-resident defendants."89
In practice then, notwithstanding the statutory language suggesting
Kentucky is a specific jurisdiction only state, Kentucky courts assert
85. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 454.210.
86. Id. § 454.210(2)(a)-(b).
87. See, e.g., Cummings v. Pitman, 239 S.W.3d 77, 84 (Ky. 2007); Mohler v. Dorado Wings, Inc.,
675 S.W.2d 404, 405 (Ky. Ct. App. 1984).
88. See Elder v. Perry County Hosp., Nos. 2005-CA-000591-MR, 2005-CA-001843-MR, 2007 WL
2685007 at *4, 5 (Ky. Ct. App. 2007); see also Mohler, 675 S.W.2d at 407.
89. Wilson v. Case, 85 S.W.3d 589, 592 (Ky. 2002) (citing Mohler, 675 S.W.2d at 405).
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that they exercise general jurisdiction out to the limits permitted by
the United States Constitution.9"
Confusion, however, arises from the test Kentucky courts purport
to use in evaluating a defendant's contacts with Kentucky. As the
Supreme Court of Kentucky recently explained, it applies a "three-
prong jurisdictional test to evaluate a defendant's contacts with
[Kentucky] for purposes of long-arm jurisdiction.., and jurisdiction
will lie only where all three are satisfied."9' This test is routinely
cited verbatim by Kentucky courts analyzing long-arm jurisdiction. 92
The first and third prongs present no particular analytical challenge:
they respectively require a) that the defendant have "purposefully
availed himself of the privilege of acting within the forum state or
causing a consequence in the forum state," and b) that the defendant
"have a substantial enough connection to [Kentucky] to make
exercise of jurisdiction . . . reasonable." 93 The second prong,
however, "considers whether the cause of action arises from the
defendant's activities in the forum," which would appear to limit
Kentucky to only exercising specific jurisdiction. 94 However, as
discussed above, at least one Kentucky court has recited that test, and
then gone on to suggest that if the defendant regularly conducted or
solicited business in Kentucky, then general jurisdiction would be
available. 95 In reviewing the available appellate decisions, Kentucky
appellate courts do not appear to have upheld an exercise of general
jurisdiction, but nor have they expressly rejected it either, and instead
have made varying and confusing statements about the topic.96
Ultimately, Kentucky's long-arm approach appears unclear; it is
hoped that future cases or action by the Kentucky General Assembly
will clarify it.
90. Cummings, 239 S.W.3d at 84; accordPowers v. Park, 192 S.W.3d 439, 443 (Ky. Ct. App. 2006)
(discussing requirements for exercise of general jurisdiction in Kentucky courts).
91. Cummings, 239 S.W.3d at 85.
92. ld; accord Wilson, 85 S.W.3d at 593; Powers, 192 S.W.3d at 442; Mohler, 675 S.W.2d at 405-
06.
93. Cummings, 239 S.W.3d at 85.
94. Id.
95. Powers, 192 S.W.3d at 443.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 91-95.
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F. Louisiana
Louisiana's long arm statute expressly allows general
jurisdiction. 97 The original Louisiana long arm statute only provided
for jurisdiction "as to a cause of action arising from" certain
enumerated acts. 98  However, in 1987 the Louisiana legislature
amended the long arm statute by adding a catch-all provision, which
provides, "[i]n addition to the provisions of Subsection A, a court of
this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident on
any basis consistent with the constitution of this state and of the
Constitution of the United States."99 The Louisiana Supreme Court,
following the language of the amendment to the statute, has upheld
the assertion of general personal jurisdiction to the limits of
constitutional due process. 00 When analyzing personal jurisdiction,
the Louisiana courts now only analyze the constitutional due process
requirements, forgoing any determination under the state's long arm
statute. 01
G. Mississippi
Mississippi's courts may also exercise general jurisdiction. 102 The
language of Mississippi's long arm statue has changed over the years,
affecting the extraterritorial power of their courts. The predecessor to
Mississippi's current long arm statute only allowed the courts to
exercise personal jurisdiction over nonresidents if the cause of action
arose from the nonresident's contacts with the state.10 3 There was
also another statute that was supplemental to the long arm and which
97. Bridges v. Autozone Props., Inc., 900 So. 2d 784, 801 (La. 2005) (discussing LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13:3201 and holding that "the limits of Louisiana's long-arm statute [were] coextensive with the
limits of constitutional Due Process").
98. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Avco Corp., 513 So. 2d 1188, 1190 (La. 1987) (emphasis added).
99. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13:3201(B).
100. de Reyes v. Marine, 586 So. 2d 103, 105 (La. 1991); Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 513 So. 2d at
1192.
101. Eng'g Dynamics, Inc. v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., 917 So. 2d 1168, 1173 (La. Ct. App. 2005).
102. Estate of Jones v. Phillips ex rel. Phillips, 992 So. 2d 1131, 1141 (Miss. 2008).
103. S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Fox, 609 So. 2d 357, 359-60 (Miss. 1992) (discussing the prior version of
MISS. CODE ANN. § 13-3-57).
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subjected foreign corporations to personal jurisdiction if the
corporation was doing business in Mississippi, regardless of "whether
or not the cause of action" was related to the business activity.104 The
statute allowing general jurisdiction over corporations was repealed
in 1988 leaving the long arm statute, which was limited to specific
jurisdiction, as the only authorization to assert extraterritorial
power. 10 5 Then, in 1991, when enacting the current version of their
long arm statute, the Mississippi legislature repealed the nexus
requirement contained in the prior version of the long arm statute. 10
6
Thus, general jurisdiction is appropriate under the current long arm
statute.10 7 However, the Mississippi courts still employ a two-step
analysis when determining if personal jurisdiction exists. 10 8 First, the
courts will determine if the elements of the long arm statute are met
and then "whether the statute's application to that defendant offends
the Due Process Clause."'
10 9
H. North Carolina
The North Carolina courts have interpreted North Carolina's long
arm statute as conferring jurisdiction to the extent allowed by due
process.1l l As relating to general jurisdiction, the pertinent part of
North Carolina's long arm statute authorizes personal jurisdiction
over anyone served, in any allowed action, if the party "[i]s engaged
in substantial activity within this State."'' North Carolina courts
interpret this provision as giving them "the full jurisdictional powers
104. MISS. CODE ANN. § 79-1-27 (repealed 1988); accord Gross v. Chevrolet County, Inc., 655 So. 2d
873, 878-79 (1995).
105. Gross, 655 So. 2d at 878.
106. Id.; S. Pac. Transp. Co., 609 So. 2d at 360, n.5 (discussing the 1991 amendment of Miss. CODE
ANN. § 13-3-57).
107. See Estate of Jones, 992 So. 2d at 1139; Am. Cable Corp v. Trilogy Commc'ns., Inc., 754 So. 2d
545, 550 (Miss. Ct. App. 2000).
108. Estate ofJones, 992 So. 2d at 1137.
109. Id.
110. Skinner v. Preferred Credit, 638 S.E.2d 203, 208 (N.C. 2006).
111. N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-75.4(1)(d).
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permissible under federal due process ' 112 and have asserted general
personal jurisdiction based on this section of their long arm statute. 113
The question of whether personal jurisdiction exists in North
Carolina over a defendant who "is engaged in substantial activity
within" North Carolina thus becomes a single "question of whether
the defendant has the minimum contacts with North Carolina
necessary to meet the requirements of due process."'' 14
I. South Carolina
South Carolina courts look to two sections of the South Carolina
code when exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction. The South Carolina
code contains a traditional long arm statute that includes an
enumerated list of activities that support jurisdiction, S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 36-2-803.115 After the enumerated list, the statute limits South
Carolina courts operating under this section to the exercise of specific
jurisdiction. 116
In addition to the traditional enumerated list, S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-
2-802, entitled "Personal Jurisdiction Based Upon Enduring
Relationship," supports jurisdiction over a "person domiciled in,
organized under the laws of, doing business, or maintaining his or its
principal place of business in, this State as to any cause of action."
'1 17
This particular section supports the exercise of jurisdiction based on
the pre-International Shoe concepts of presence and "doing
business."1 18 However, the South Carolina Supreme Court concluded
this provision allows for the exercise of general jurisdiction in
112. Skinner, 638 S.E.2d at 208; Cambridge Homes of N.C. Ltd. P'ship v. Hyundai Constr., Inc., 670
S.E.2d 290, 295 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
113. Bruggeman v. Meditrust Acquisition Co., 532 S.E.2d 215, 218 (N.C. Ct. App. 2000).
114. Id.
115. S.C. CODEANN. § 36-2-803(A).
116. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803(B) ("When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this
section, only a cause of action arising from acts enumerated in this section may be asserted against
him.") (emphasis added).
117. S.C.CODE ANN. § 36-2-802.
118. Twitchell, supra note 2 at 621-22.
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Coggeshall v. Reproductive Endocrine Associates of Charlotte."19
Thus, this conclusion mixes the modem concept of general
jurisdiction with the more traditional notions of presence in the forum
state embodied in S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-802. Although general
jurisdiction does not fit cleanly into this statute, this approach avoids
the flawed analysis of many state appellate courts-simply ignoring
clear statutory provisions that limit the exercise of jurisdiction to
claims "arising under" certain activities.
J. Tennessee
Tennessee courts have concluded general jurisdiction is available
to litigants in Tennessee. The Tennessee code contains two sections
which address extraterritorial jurisdiction, TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-
214 and TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-223. Section 20-2-214 introduces a
typical enumerated list of activities with the specific jurisdiction
language, "arising from."' 120 This section also includes an umbrella
provision that supports jurisdiction on "[a]ny basis not inconsistent
with the constitution of this state or of the United States." 121 Section
20-2-223 also contains an enumerated list of activities similar, but not
identical to, Section 20-2-214.122 Notably, both sections contain the
language of specific jurisdiction, "arising from."' 123 Although these
provisions span two sections of the code, the sections bleed together
in Tennessee courts.
124
On its face, the Tennessee long arm statute contains internal
inconsistencies. Because general jurisdiction is consistent with the
Constitution, the umbrella provision appears to broaden the reach of
119. Coggeshall v. Reprod. Endocrine Assocs. of Charlotte, 655 S.E. 2d 476, 478 (S.C. 2007)
("General jurisdiction is the State's right to exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant even though
the suit does not arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with the forum; general jurisdiction is
determined under S.C. Code Ann. § 36-2-802.") (internal citations omitted).
120. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-214(a)(1)-(6).
121. Id. § 20-2-214(a)(6).
122. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-223.
123. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 20-2-214, 20-2-223.
124. Gregurek v. Swope Motors, Inc., 138 S.W.3d 882, 884 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2003) ("The trial court
found jurisdiction over Swope Motors based on Tennessee's long-arm statute, Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-
2-214, 20-2-223.").
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the Tennessee long arm statute to include the exercise of general
jurisdiction. 12 5 Yet, the Tennessee legislature did not address the
limitation that the cause of action "arise from" a specific list of
actions. The Tennessee legislature simply added the umbrella
provision to the list of activities that support jurisdiction in response
to efforts in Rhode Island and California to expand their long arm
statutes to the limits of the Fourteenth Amendment. 126 Thus, the full
reach of the Tennessee long arm statute is unclear.
In Gegurek v. Swope Motors, Inc., the Tennessee Court of Appeals
reviewed the nature of specific and general jurisdiction' 27 and
concluded the defendant's contacts with Tennessee did not rise to the
level of "continuous and systematic.' 128 In coming to this conclusion,
the Tennessee Court of Appeals held out the possibility of general
jurisdiction, which would be permitted under the umbrella provision,
but declined to exercise it. 129 Like the Tennessee legislature, the
Gegurek court declined to deal with the "arising from" limitation
contained in the statute.
K Texas
Although general jurisdiction exists in Texas, the long arm statute
seems fully entrenched in the traditional concept of presence as the
basis for power over a defendant.1 30 The Texas statute operates with
an expansive definition for "doing business" in the State of Texas:
In addition to other acts that may constitute doing business, a
nonresident does business in this state if the nonresident: (1)
contracts by mail or otherwise with a Texas resident and either
party is to perform the contract in whole or in part in this state;
125. TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-2-214(a)(6).
126. Robert Banks, Jr., The Future of General Jurisdiction in Tennessee, 27 U. MEM. L. REv. 559,
581 (1997).
127. Gregurek, 138 S.W.3d at 884-85.
128. Id. at 885.
129. Id. at884-85.
130. TEx. Crv. PRAc. & REMEDIES CODEANN. § 17.041-.045
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(2) commits a tort in whole or in part in this state; or (3) recruits
Texas residents, directly or through an intermediary located in
this state, for employment inside or outside this state.
31
The statute then takes this expansive definition for "doing business,"
and appoints the secretary of state as an agent for service of process
for "a nonresident who engages in business in this state, but does not
maintain a regular place of business in this state or a designated agent
for service of process, in any proceeding that arises out of the
business done in this state and to which the nonresident is a party."'
132
The Texas statute provides an expansive definition of "doing
business"; however, it lacks any provision which actually confers
jurisdiction over any person or entity "doing business" in the state.
The presence of the secretary of state in the state serves as the basis
for jurisdiction over nonresident defendants. 133 While the Texas long
arm operates in an unusual fashion, it contains the familiar specific
jurisdiction requirement that the proceeding "arise out of the business
done in this state."'
134
The Texas Supreme Court has seized on the non-exclusive nature
of what qualifies as "doing business" to expand Texas long arm
jurisdiction to the full limits of the Fourteenth Amendment. 135 Noting
the Supreme Court's endorsement of general jurisdiction, the Texas
Supreme Court presumed the availability of general jurisdiction
without addressing the "arising out of' language contained in §
17.044(b). After reviewing the basic concept of general jurisdiction,
the Texas Supreme Court endorsed the view of Professors Twitchell
131. Id. § 17.042.
132. Id § 17.044(b).
133. Id.
134. Id. (emphasis added).
135. PHC-Minden, L.P. v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 235 S.W.3d 163, 166 (Tex. 2007) ("[The Texas
long-arm] statute permits Texas courts to exercise jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant that 'does
business' in Texas, and the statute identifies some activities that constitute 'doing business.' The list,
however, is not exclusive. We have held that section 17.042's language extends Texas courts' personal
jurisdiction 'as far as the federal constitutional requirements of due process will permit."') (internal
citations omitted).
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and Rhodes that "true" general jurisdiction is "dispute-blind."' 136
Additionally, the Texas Supreme Court focused on the "continuous
and systematic" language of Helicopteros.137 The Texas Supreme
Court then examined the contacts of a Louisiana hospital with the
state of Texas: two trips to Texas by employees of the hospital for
business meetings, numerous payments to hospital vendors over the
previous eight years, and three contracts involving Texas entities. 138
The court concluded that these contacts did not rise to the level of
"continuous and systematic" and declined to exercise general
jurisdiction.' 39
L. Virginia
Notwithstanding the state long arm statute, general jurisdiction
exists in Virginia. The Virginia long arm statute allows for personal
jurisdiction over a person as to causes of action arising from an
enumerated list of activities. 140 When jurisdiction is based on the
Virginia long arm statute, Virginia courts are limited only to causes
of action "arising from acts enumerated in this section.' 14 1 The
Virginia Supreme Court, however, has found that the doctrine of
general jurisdiction simply falls outside the confines of the state long
arm statute. 142 Under the Virginia Supreme Court's interpretation,
"the long-ann statute does not address the doctrine of general
jurisdiction arising out of significant presence of a party in
Virginia., 143 The Virginia Supreme Court thus reaches outside the
confines of the Virginia long arm statute to seize the concept of
general jurisdiction, rather than try to fit it into a specific jurisdiction
statute. Because state courts have historically relied upon the state
136. Id. at 168-69 (quoting Twitchel, supra note 2, at 613 (internal citation omitted)).
137. PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 166-68, (citing Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408 (1984)).
138. PHC-Minden, 235 S.W.3d at 170-71.
139. Id. at 171.
140. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-328.1(A).
141. Id. § 8.01-328.1(C)
142. Witt v. Reynolds Metals Co., 397 S.E.2d 873, 875 (Va. 1990).
143. Id.
1200 [Vol. 25:4
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long arm statute as a basis for exercising extraterritorial jurisdiction,
this analysis represents somewhat of a shift in personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence. This analysis, however, recognizes that a long arm
statute with an enumerated list and an arising under limitation,
properly read, does not comport with the exercise of general
jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
A. Survey Results
All of the eleven Southern states other than Georgia examined in
this survey permit their courts to exercise general jurisdiction,
although there is diversity in how they reach that result. In six of the
jurisdictions, the applicable statute or regulation explicitly provides
that the courts may exercise personal jurisdiction to the limits
permitted by federal due process requirements. 144 Georgia's other
five Southern neighbors have achieved general jurisdiction through
an expansive reading of their long-arm provisions by their state
courts. 1
45
B. Recommendations for Georgia
As discussed above, Georgia is currently a specific jurisdiction-
only state. 146 Georgia is alone among its Southern neighbors in
choosing to continue to artificially limit the jurisdictional reach of its
courts. Ironically, a Georgia plaintiff is more likely to be able to sue a
nonresident defendant in a federal court in Georgia than in a Georgia
state court-subject matter jurisdiction questions aside. 147 This odd
situation exists because federal courts in Georgia exercise general
jurisdiction to the limits of federal due process-notwithstanding the
144. The six jurisdictions with an explicit statutory or procedural grant of general jurisdiction are
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Tennessee.
145. These five states are Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia.
146. See text accompanying notes 67-84.
147. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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language of the Georgia long-arm statute and consistent interpretation
of it by Georgia courts as only providing specific jurisdiction-while
the Georgia General Assembly has chosen not to permit a Georgia
resident (or other plaintiffs) to sue a nonresident defendant on a cause
not arising from the defendant's contacts with Georgia. 48 As
discussed above, however, the Georgia Court of Appeals' recent
decision in Colemon has created uncertainty about whether Georgia
courts will continue to adhere to the statutory language and insist that
the cause of action arise from the defendant's contacts with
Georgia. 14
9
The Georgia General Assembly should remedy this situation by
permitting Georgia courts to exercise personal jurisdiction to the
limits imposed by the 14th Amendment. The cleanest way to do this
would be to repeal the current long-arm statute and replace it with
something like Arkansas's statute. 150 Such a statute would simply
state that Georgia's courts "shall have personal jurisdiction of all
persons, and all causes of action or claims for relief, to the maximum
extent permitted by the due process of law clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution."'1 51
Failing that, Georgia should alternatively add a residuary clause to
the current long-arm statute-possibly making other revisions to the
current prongs concurrently-resembling the one Louisiana added,
which reads "[i]n addition to the provisions of Subsection A, a court
of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident on
any basis consistent with the constitution of this state and of the
Constitution of the United States."'152 Two Southern states have used
this approach, i.e., adding a catch-all clause to an enumerated list-
type long-arm statute, although one that did it a while ago has
recently jettisoned the enumerated list, presumably as redundant and
148. See supra text accompanying notes 67-84.
149. See supra notes 73-84 and accompanying text.
150. See ARK. CODE ANN. §16-4-101(B).
151. Id.
152. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3201(B).
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potentially confusing.153 If Georgia decided to go this route, it would
also need to either amend or simply delete the preamble language in
O.G.C.A. § 9-10-91 requiring that the cause of action "aris[e] from"
the defendant's contacts with Georgia.
154
However the General Assembly chooses to proceed, it would
thereby "provide the maximum protection for Georgia residents
damaged by the out-of-state acts or omissions committed by
nonresident tortfeasors" constitutionally possible, something no
Georgian should fear. 155 Action by the General Assembly would also
resolve the ambiguity created by the recent Colemon decision and
ensure that basic choices about policy and the jurisdiction of Georgia
courts are made by the legislative branch rather than the judiciary. 156
153. The Southern jurisdictions that have a residuary clause in addition to an enumerated list are
Louisiana and Tennessee. Alabama had an enumerated list and a catch-all clause but now only uses the
catch-all clause.
154. O.C.G.A. § 9-10-91; accord supra notes 67, 69 and accompanying text.
155. Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., LLC v. First Nat7I Bank ofAmes, 620 S.E. 2d 352, 355
(Ga. 2005) (lamenting the General Assembly's continued failure to provide such protection and relief
for Georgia residents).
156. See supra notes 73-81 and accompanying text.
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